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Corporate Cyborgs and Technology Risks
Andrea M. Matwyshyn*
I. INTRODUCTION
The law has long treated corporations as persons with
rights, and it continues to expand this treatment.1 In a similar
vein, in technology contexts, the practical differentiation
between human persons and corporate persons grows tenuous
in many respects. Today’s corporations seem more enmeshed in
our daily reality, more anthropomorphic and “friendly.” The
local radio station wants to be your Facebook friend. The
Twitter feed of your favorite coffee chain intermingles with
feeds authored by your human friends. Internally, however,
corporations are becoming progressively less “human”; they are
relying less upon the particular human employees that fill the
physical space of the corporate headquarters and relying more
upon their information systems. This seeming contradiction of
internal mechanization with external humanization calls to
mind the metaphor of a “cyborg”—a hybrid creature that is part
machine and part human.
This shift in corporate identity toward a cyborg identity
warrants new legal consideration: the shift has carried with it
technology driven risks to both individual entities and the
economy as a whole. This article argues that, as companies
progressively shift to a blended human-machine identity,
dangers lurk from overzealous technology adoption without
strong audit mechanisms and oversight. Historical examples
warn us that organizations sometimes adopt technology
overzealously, prior to the consideration of the full implications
of this adoption. Using the securities industry as a case study
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reached at amatwysh@wharton.upenn.edu.
1. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913
(2010).
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of cyborg transformation, this article points to the historical
example of the Books and Records Crisis that plagued the
securities markets in the 1960s and 1970s and required SEC
intervention.
Drawing
lessons
about
technology
mismanagement from this crisis, it raises questions regarding
today’s technology reliant corporations. In particular, this
article raises questions with regard to information
management and information security. The piece concludes by
calling for an information accountability regime with more
meaningful internal and external corporate oversight that more
effectively blends regimes of corporate, securities, contract,
intellectual property, tort and criminal law.
II. THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE CYBORG:
MECHANICAL INTERIOR WITH A HUMAN FACE
Cyborgs have been a fixture in science fiction literature,2
movies,3 and technology theory for decades.4 Part machine and
part human, they embody two types of creatures. On the one
hand, cyborgs can be humans who have extended their
capabilities through technology enhancement to their bodies,
such as two professors who have surgically attached various
gadgetry to their bodies.5 On the other hand, cyborgs can be
machines that have a decidedly human appearance and are
capable of generating human emotional connections to them,
such as the fictional Terminator from the movie series of the
same name.6 Corporations today appear to be evolving into this
second type of cyborg—a machine with a human appearance
capable of generating emotional connections.
2. See, e.g., MARTIN CAIDIN, CYBORG (1972).
3. Perhaps the most widely recognizable cyborg character from popular
culture is that of Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Terminator character from the
movie series of the same name. The Terminator appeared as a human to the
outside world in a conventionally attractive physical form and functioned
relatively effectively in a world of humans in pursuing its goals. It was also
capable of winning humans’ trust. However, upon closer examination, his
behaviors gave away the truth of his interior: he was, first and foremost, a
machine programmed with certain preferences and directions. THE
TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984).
4. For a discussion of cyborg theory, see generally CHRIS GRAY, THE
CYBORG HANDBOOK (1995).
5. See, e.g., Lisa Guernsey, At Airport Gate, A Cyborg Unplugged, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at G4; Kevin Warwick, The University of Reading,
http://www.kevinwarwick.com/ (last visited March 10, 2010).
6. THE TERMINATOR, supra note 3.
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As the types of assets that dominate many companies have
moved away from tangibles toward intangibles,7 corporate
structure has also evolved. Internally, a corporation
conceptualizes itself as a type of machine—a series of
overlapping information networks, both human and
technological. Externally, a corporation seeks to be viewed as a
trusted (human) friend to maximize its goodwill. Internal
corporate information flows are increasingly mechanized
through computerization; externally, however, corporations
work to maintain a human face to build brand and customer
loyalty. On one hand, companies are struggling with growing
into heavily technology-driven structures of information
management,8 but on the other, they still view the external
projection of human characteristics as being of foremost
business importance.
A. INTERNAL MECHANIZATION
Companies are increasingly internally mechanized;
information management and computer systems are driving
dramatic change inside companies. Businesses have become
progressively more technology-centric and, consequently,
organized in large part around their unifying computer
systems. Since Time Magazine named “The Computer” as its
person of the year in 1983,9 corporations’ reliance on
information systems has increased significantly, as have the
capabilities of those systems. This integration of information
technology into corporate operations during the last two
decades has changed the ways that companies handle
information—both sensitive internal information and
personally identifiable consumer information.10

7. For example, goodwill alone frequently makes up over 15 percent of
corporate assets in large companies. Get Out the Red Pen, BARRON’S, Feb. 16,
2009,
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB123457702581886857.html?mod=wsjcrmai
n.
8. See Jim Carr, From RSA: Financial Services Companies Struggling
with Multichannel Authentication, SC MAGAZINE, Apr. 10, 2008,
http://www.scmagazineus.com/From-RSA-Financial-services-companiesstruggling-with-multichannel-authentication/article/108906/.
Jan.
3,
1983,
available
at
9. Cover,
TIME,
http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19830103,00.html.
10. Further, as internet purchases became a regular part of consumer
economic behaviors in the late 1990s, a new economic environment emerged.
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Companies have increasingly centralized sensitive
corporate information:11 trade secret information,12 financial
information,13 business partner and customer information is
centralized in companies’ internal computer systems. This
centralization arose because businesses sought to solve
communication problems among various parts of the company,
and overcoming these communication obstacles across
machines became a corporate priority for many organizations.14
The goal was, therefore, to allow all parts of the organization to
effectively interact with each other and communicate internal
data.15 Business communications progressively shifted from

The defining characteristic of this new commercial environment has been
widespread corporate collection, aggregation, and leveraging of personally
identifiable consumer data with the assistance of information systems.
Consumers increasingly venture online to engage in information-sensitive
activities, such as checking bank balances or transmitting credit card
information in connection with purchases. See SUSANNAH FOX ET AL., TRUST
AND PRIVACY ONLINE: WHY AMERICANS WANT TO REWRITE THE RULES 13, 15
(2000),
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2000/PIP_Trust_Privacy_R
eport.pdf. Many companies today hoard data for marketing and other
purposes. They collect as much information as possible about their customers
in the name of targeting products more effectively and generating secondary
streams of revenue through licensing their databases of consumer information.
H.R. Rep. No. 106-74, pt. 3, at 106–07 (1999).
11. For example, most law firms use document management systems to
centralize work product. For a discussion of document management software,
see Dennis Kennedy & John Gelagin, Want to Save 16 Minutes Every Day?,
Feb.
1,
2003,
FINDLAW,
http://technology.findlaw.com/resources/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=//artic
les/00006/009973.html. This use of information technology serves to facilitate
knowledge management, the sharing of institutional intellectual resources
such as form contracts, and control over access to certain information. Id.
12. For a discussion of the risks that trade secret information faces from
technology, see, for example, Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret
Disclosures on the Internet Through Sequential Preservation, 2007 B.C.
INTELL.
PROP.
&
TECH.
F.
091101,
at
4
(2007),
http://bciptf.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=30
.
13. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act specifically considers the implications of
corporate uses of financial information. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.).
14. These attempts to centralize built in high dependencies between
systems. See, e.g., Wayne Labs, Machine Control: Still Islands of Automation?,
FOOD ENGINEERING, Jan. 2006, at 97, 97–99.
15. In the context of manufacturing, this meant connecting up “islands of
automation” into a single communication network. See id.
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real space to virtual space,16 and entirely new technologycontingent information businesses have arisen, such as eBay
and Google.17 Even the most traditional of companies began to
experiment with internet sales through company websites.
Increasing computerization and automation of businesses
generated enterprise-wide computing.
B. EXTERNAL HUMANIZATION
Corporations
have
gone
to
great
lengths
to
anthropomorphize their images in order to generate consumer
trust and brand loyalty. They engage in philanthropy18 and
advertise in ways that are intended to create interpersonal
connection between the brand and the customer. Recently,
these advertising outreach efforts have extended to social
networking websites such as Facebook. In 2008, approximately
$1.6 billion was spent on U.S. online social network
advertisements.19 Business enterprises have pages,20 friends,21
fans,22 and send and receive messages through social networks;
they participate as any human would. If content creation can
be used to judge impact, these personification efforts appear to
16. See, e.g., Ed Frauenheim, Report: E-mail Volume Grows Rapidly,
NEWS,
Oct.
2,
2003,
http://news.com.com/2110-1032CNET
5085956.html?tag=3Dnefd_hed (last visited May 7, 2010) (noting an 80%
growth in volume of corporate email between 2002 and 2003).
17. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Website Terms of Use
Agreements, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 508 (2003). As a consequence of this
transformation, numerous state corporate statutes have been amended to
allow for email notice, virtual shareholder meetings, and internet proxy
voting. Gary W. Derrick & Irving L. Faught, New Developments in Oklahoma
Business Entity Law, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 259, 263 (2003); Robert C. Pozen,
Institutional Perspectives on Shareholder Nominations of Corporation
Directors, 59 BUS. LAW. 95, 102–03 (2003).
18. See, e.g., Terry Timm Moos, Cisco Systems Honored with 2005
Excellence in Corporate Philanthropy Award, (Feb. 27, 2006),
http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2006/hd_022706b.html.
19. Rachael King, Building a Brand with Widgets, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar.
3,
2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2008/tc20080303_000743
_page_2.htm.
20. See, e.g., Facebook: Starbucks, http://www.facebook.com/Starbucks
(last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
21. See, e.g., Boystown Live, http://www.boystownlive.com (last visited
Mar. 9, 2010).
22. Ben and Jerry’s has over one million fans on Facebook. See Facebook:
Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., http://www.facebook.com/benjerry (last visited
Mar. 9, 2010).
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be working—hundreds of user generated pages about
companies,23 products,24 corporate officers25 and corporate
characters have been created.26 Corporate “characters” or
branded mascots, in particular, have engendered numerous
hate groups27 and fan groups28 where people discuss their
emotional reactions to these characters, just as they do with
regard to human celebrities.29 For example, the change of the
eTrade spokesbaby during the 2010 Superbowl resulted in an
almost instantaneous internet outcry.30 These technology-based
extensions of the corporate person are becoming increasingly
important in marketing efforts and goodwill generation. The
last fifteen years have brought a dramatic transformation to
the structure, outreach and internal dynamics of companies. In
1995, internet browsers were a novelty. In 2010, almost every
company feels compelled to maintain an internet presence and
offer multiple technology-aided forms of communication. No
23. See,
e.g.,
Facebook:
Microsoft,
http://www.facebook.com/Microsoft?ref=search&sid=100000695049406.103344
7816..1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
24. See, e.g., Facebook: i am a pc and ……SHUT UP!!, http://engb.facebook.com/pages/i-am-a-pc-and-SHUT-UP/321665282894 (last visited
Mar. 10, 2010).
25. See,
e.g.,
Facebook:
I
HATE
BILL
GATES,
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=4836749570&ref=search&sid=100000
695049406.3743157703..1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
26. See,
e.g.,
Facebook:
E*TRADE
Baby,
http://www.facebook.com/search/?q=etrade+baby&init=quick#!/etradebaby?ref
=search&sid=1247199379.932930107..1 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
27. See,
e.g.,
Facebook:
I
hate
Clippy,
http://www.facebook.com/search/?flt=1&q=clippy&o=65&sid=605538877.20023
31308..1&s=0#!/group.php?gid=303574911105&ref=search&sid=605538877.19
87303274..1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
28. See,
e.g.,
Facebook:
R.I.P.
Clippy
1997-2007,
http://www.facebook.com/pages/RIP-Clippy-The-Microsoft-PaperClip/103394899696284 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
29. See, e.g., Facebook: Lady Gaga, http://www.facebook.com/ladygaga
(last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
30. See, e.g., Tanya Irwin, New Etrade ‘Baby’ Arrives During Super Bowl,
Jan.
15,
2010,
MEDIADAILYNEWS,
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=120
739; James Poniewozik, James Brown Takes One for the Team, TUNED IN (Jan.
25, 2010, 10:05 AM), http://tunedin.blogs.time.com/2010/01/25/james-browntakes-one-for-the-team/; digitalLouisville.com, What Louisville Is Saying
About… E-trade, http://www.digitalouisville.com/keyword/e-trade (last visited
Mar.
9,
2010);
Love
the
E
Trade
Baby,
http://www.experienceproject.com/groups/Love-The-E-Trade-Baby/193839 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2010).
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longer are consumers simply reading advertisements; they are
interacting with companies in many of the same ways they
interact with humans online. Real time chat agents are
available for immediate questions.31 Call centers frequently
staffed by agents, even if located in another country, are a
Skype call away. Consumers increasingly feel that even feel
that companies are “following” them too closely using
technological means online—much like a nosy neighbor or a
paparazzo might in real life.32
As one might assume, a fundamental tension exists
between these two trends of progressive mechanization and
simultaneous humanization. This tension, consequently, is
leading to management failures. However, unlike most other
types of management failures, information management
failures frequently negatively impact not only the entity itself,
but also negatively impact other technologically-connected
entities.33 Thus this tension in corporate cyborg identity has
given rise to new information privacy, security and legal
concerns.
III. TECHNOLOGY RISKS, FAILS, AND CORPORATE
CYBORGS
Although companies are aggressively marching forward in
their technology adoption and reliance, they sometimes neglect
to build the internal management infrastructure necessary to
use new technologies responsibly. These management failures
result in ignoring or unwittingly assuming significant
technology risks that can meaningfully damage corporate
assets
and
goodwill.
In
other
words,
technology
mismanagement can undercut companies’ own efforts as
anthropomorphized identities. One industry that provides an
example of this corporate struggle between mechanization and

31. See,
e.g.,
Dell
–
Hardware
Chat,
http://support.dell.com/support/topics/global.aspx/support/chat/hardware_chat
?c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
32. Douglas MacMillan, Facebook Privacy Policies Draw Criticism by 15
Consumer Groups, May 6, 2010, BUSINESSWEEK,
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-06/facebook-privacy-policiesdraw-criticism-by-15-consumer-groups.html (last visited May 7, 2010).
33. For a discussion of the “shared secret” nature of information and the
transitive effects of data breaches, see, e.g., Cem Paya, Quasi-secrets, Chapter
9 in ANDREA MATWYSHYN (ED.), HARBORING DATA (2009).

MATWYSHYN_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

580

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

6/10/2010 3:22 PM

[Vol. 11:2

humanization is the securities industry.
A. THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY BOOKS AND RECORDS CRISIS: A
CASE STUDY OF “FAILS”
In technology slang, the term FAIL refers to an impressive
failure—meaning a failure that is impressive for all the wrong
reasons. Frequently preceded by the word “epic,”34 a FAIL is
used to describe events evidencing an extraordinary level of
incompetence, stupidity or bad luck.35 However, the original
use of the word “fail” actually referred to a failed securities
transaction during a notorious and embarrassing period in
securities history known as the Books and Records Crisis. The
Crisis was marked by extreme levels of technology
mismanagement and deficient risk assessment: as new
technology was introduced on exchanges and within
brokerages, a clash between new computerized elements and
the preexisting human elements resulted. The Books and
Records Crisis served as a harbinger of the struggles of today’s
corporate cyborgs.
1. The History of the Crisis
The Books and Record Crisis refers to the 1967–1971
period where over five billion dollars worth of “fails”—trades
that were not properly settled36—threatened to destabilize the
securities industry and exchanges.37 Described by industry
insiders as a “terrifying and unending nightmare,”38 the crisis
arose in part because the securities industry failed to
successfully evolve in response to the introduction of the critical
pieces of technology by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
which resulted in greatly increased trading volume.39 While
34. For examples of epic FAILS, see FAIL Blog, http://failblog.org/ (last
visited March 9, 2010).
35. See id.
36. Brokers were required to deliver physical certificates that were signed
and notarized within five days of executing a trade to “settle” the trade.
Because of the complexity of the bureaucratic process required post-trade,
certificates frequently failed to materialize by the deadline. Wyatt Wells,
Certificates and Computers: The Remaking of Wall Street, 1967 to 1971, 74
BUS. HIST. REV. 193, 203 (2000).
37. Id. at 203–07.
38. These were the words of a partner in a Chicago brokerage. Id. at 207.
39. These technologies included the 900 Ticker, the radio paging system,
and the full automation of floor data in 1964–1966. See NYSE Euronext,
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brokerages struggled to maintain trusted relationships with
clients, their internal technology mismanagement undercut
these efforts. This crisis resulted in significant part from the
overzealous implementation and use of new technology on
exchanges and in brokerages without considering the risks and
outcomes. In the words of one author, the brokerage houses
reflected “scarcity of individuals of managerial ability and
talent” and many of the largest brokerages lacked any system
of internal audits.40 Thus, when new trading technologies
started to be introduced on exchanges, firms could not
successfully adapt to handle record trading volume post-trade,
and, in 1968, record trading volume on exchanges and in overthe-counter markets began to outstrip brokerage houses’ ability
to keep up in their records. Brokerage houses began trading at
rates faster than their own employees could settle the
transactions post-trade.41 Instead of investing in expansion or
cutting down trading rates to a level the firms could settle,
many brokerages simply chose to ignore the problem and
continue trading. Aggressive trading was perceived to be the
best strategy for securing large returns;42 the rest of operations
were deemed a lower priority.
Records of brokerages became plagued with the notation
“DK” which stood for “Don’t Know about the transaction,”
indicating that errors existed somewhere in the trading
process. Even brokerages that worked to keep their records in
order were negatively affected by the inadequacies of other
firms. Because firms traded with each other regularly on an
exchange floor and over the counter, if one broker’s failed
recordkeeping resulted in the inability to settle a trade, both
brokers suffered a “fail.”43 In the words of one study, “[t]he
operations sins of one company were visited upon others.”44
Timeline, http://www.nyse.com/about/history/timeline_1960_1979_index.html
(last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
40. Wells, supra note 36, at 198.
41. An antiquated system of transferring ownership existed: stock
certificates needed to be signed, notarized and physically transferred. Brokers
needed to process this paperwork and keep accurate records on transfers. The
purchase or sale of a single security might require as many as sixty-eight
separate tasks and an error anywhere in the process would result in a failed
transaction. Id. at 201.
42. Id. at 200–01.
43. Id. at 206.
44. Id. at 207.

MATWYSHYN_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

582

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

6/10/2010 3:22 PM

[Vol. 11:2

Although NYSE began to urge members to correct their
internal problems, by the spring of 1968, the SEC reached the
conclusion that inadequate pressure existed to motivate firms
to rectify backlogs of failed trades.45 In July 1968, the SEC
asserted that “[i]t is a violation of the anti-fraud provisions of
the federal securities laws . . . for a broker to buy a security . . .
for a customer if the broker-dealer has reason to believe that he
will not be able to deliver the security.”46 Despite the threats of
regulatory action, firms continued to insist that they could
meet their obligations and adapt their operations to new
technologies. It became apparent, however, that these
assertions were, at best, irrationally optimistic when NYSE
sent its own staff to audit some of the delinquent firms. NYSE
later used its own funds to shut down some of these brokerages
when these audits demonstrated large scale improprieties and
deficits in management.47
The firms that were not shut down by the exchange and
SEC regulators turned to computerization of records to solve
the recordkeeping debacles.48 These firms viewed computers as
a panacea—the “magic solution”49 to solve their prior failures in
management. However, few insiders actually knew how to use
the new machines effectively, and they failed to understand
their limitations.50 Computers were not capable of restoring
order to years of recordkeeping chaos; they were limited in
their organizational ability by the humans who used them. In
the words of technologists, “Garbage in, garbage out.”51
Further, serious software malfunctions exacerbated the
difficulty of the automation process,52 and firms sometimes
began relying on computer systems before these systems had
been properly vetted for malfunctions.53 In line with this overly
exuberant reliance on the new machines, firms dismissed some
of their senior clerks, causing glitches to result in even more
serious problems in the books. In the words of the SEC, “[w]hen
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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firms . . . began to automate, they experienced substantial
problems.”54 In the case of one brokerage, it was a computer
error concealing approximately $7.5 million in liabilities that
caused the SEC to demand immediate corrective action55 and
ultimately led to the firm’s demise.56 In summary, only
computers could process the new volumes of transactions, but
they were costly and only as good as their operators and
programmers. Further, small firms could not afford to
automate with computers.57 This group of factors led to a period
of consolidation among firms58 and to billions of dollars of
mishandled trades that were never entirely straightened out.
As a result of the Crisis, the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation, a government-owned corporation, was created. 59
2. Lessons from the Crisis
The Books and Records Crisis can be analyzed as a
harbinger of the types of severe systemic consequences
technology mismanagement can cause in data intensive
industries; these risks are amplified for today’s cyborg
corporations. Specifically, analysis of the Books and Records
Crisis offers six lessons. First, technology adoption choices and
management by an interconnected business partner impacts
every member of the web of interconnection. When NYSE
adopted new technologies that dramatically expanded trading
volume capability, it resulted in a technology-driven ripple
effect in the brokerages that were interconnected with the
exchange. Mismanaged brokerages’ internal technology failures
destabilized the recordkeeping of other brokerages, including
the records of brokerages that were well-managed.
Second, when financial incentives to hide technology
inadequacy are significant, firms will sometimes lie about the
54. Id. at 211 (quoting Securities Market Agencies: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Commerce and Finance of the H. Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 143 (1969)).
55. Id. at 228.
56. Id. at 233.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 234.
59. SIPC is governed by a seven-member board, with members appointed
by the Treasury secretary, the chair of the Federal Reserve Board and the
President. It was funded by a levy on securities transactions and was
supported by a $1 billion line of credit from the federal treasury. Three
members of the board were to come from the securities industry. Id. at 226.
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extent of their managerial competence. Firms may believe it to
be in their self-interest to knowingly or recklessly exacerbate
harm to the other members of the interconnected web of
companies and to individual consumers. Audit and regulatory
oversight is essential to preserving accurate information. In the
case of the Crisis, firms asserted their ability to rectify trades
in the face of evidence to the contrary until independent NYSE
and SEC auditors confirmed otherwise.
Third, automation and technology are never a panacea;
they are always limited by the human error and skill of the
people who build and maintain systems. As firms turned to
technology during the Crisis to solve their inability to settle
trades on the back end, they realized that their prior
limitations of imperfect recordkeeping could not be rectified by
computers. Programming and data entry errors came with
financial consequences.
Fourth, companies should always expect new technologies
to fail and be prepared to compensate with redundancy
measures. Thus, a business strategy predicated on perfect
implementation and operation of a computer system will
inevitably lead to large scale failure. When computer errors
occurred during brokerages’ implementation of new systems,
because the senior clerks with the requisite knowledge to
otherwise compensate for the lost data had been fired, no
backup system existed. The results were multi-million dollar
computer errors that could have been mitigated with a backup
system.
Fifth, dramatic changes in technology always create
winners and losers, frequently driven by specialized knowledge
and capital resources. The most dangerous failure in technology
implementation is a failure to accurately assess knowledge
deficits inside an organization. As many brokerages found out
when they failed during the Crisis, businesses that incorrectly
analyze management deficits and risks may not survive
dramatic technological change. Further, technology evolution is
capital intensive and leads to elimination of small firms that
lack the corporate coffers to automate to the extent of large
firms.
Finally, regulatory responses can be successful. As the
SEC’s response to the Crisis demonstrates, the destabilizing
effect of new technologies can be mitigated through thoughtful
oversight and audit. The key to regulatory response is
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identifying problems early.
B. CORPORATE CYBORGS AND INFORMATION SECURITY
The technology management deficits of today’s corporate
cyborgs are perhaps most immediately visible in the context of
information security and intangible asset management.
Companies are processing sensitive information about
themselves and their customers, relying on their computer
systems to a high degree, but these companies are
simultaneously plagued by human errors—errors in
programming and errors in technology management. Rather
than projecting the “trustworthy” human face they seek to
project, companies frequently unintentionally generate an
untrustworthy one. Shortfalls in corporate information security
and data handling practices illustrate this tension and its
unintended negative consequences. Empirical data from
surveys of corporate officers60 and rampant data breaches of
millions of records in 2009 speak for themselves—even the
most sophisticated companies demonstrate widespread
inadequacies
in
information
security
management.61
Meanwhile, as the recent hacking of Google and approximately
thirty other technology companies demonstrates,62 not even the

60. Empirical data demonstrates that companies are not anticipating and
managing information risk. For example, in 2008 in an annual information
security survey by PriceWaterhouseCoopers of over 7,000 respondents who
comprised CEOs, CFOs, CIOs, CSOs, vice presidents and directors of IT and
information security from 119 countries, at least three of ten respondents
could not answer basic questions about the information security practices of
their organizations. PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, SAFEGUARDING THE
CURRENCY OF BUSINESS: FINDINGS FROM THE 2008 GLOBAL STATE OF
INFORMATION SECURITY STUDY 2 (2008). Thirty-five percent did not know the
number of security incidents in the last year; 44% did not know what types of
security incidents presented the greatest threats to the company’s most
sensitive information, assets and operations; 42% could not identify the source
of security incidents; 67% said their organization does not audit or monitor
compliance with the corporate information security policy—whether the attack
was most likely to have originated from employees (either current or former),
customers, partners or suppliers, hackers or others. Id. at 15.
61. See, e.g., Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Chronology of Data Breaches,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2009).
62. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Google Hackers Targeted Source Code of More
Jan.
13,
2010,
Than
30
Companies,
WIRED,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/google-hack-attack/ (last visited
May 7, 2010).
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most sophisticated of technology companies are immune from
penetration by a driven group of attackers. Each breached
record is attached to a company or a consumer potentially
harmed by the disclosure. As the negative publicity following
information security breaches at companies such as the TJX
Companies63 and Heartland64 demonstrates, mismanagement
of information systems can dramatically undercut the efforts of
a company to build a trusted human face with the outside
world.
Meaningful enterprise-wide oversight is necessary to
create a culture of information security. Returning to the case
study of the securities industry, although major players in the
securities industry have experienced data breaches in the last
five years,65 some of these entities appear to have failed to
acknowledge the importance of information security. Of the
brokerages that have experienced breaches few, if any, have an
officer-level position dedicated to information management.
Chief information officers and chief security officers are usually
missing from their rosters of officers. Meanwhile, these same
entities increasingly rely on technology to replace humans in
making trading decisions.
Approximately only three percent of the trading volume on
the NYSE is done by means of traditional “open outcry” trading
with humans; 97% of NYSE trades are executed using
electronic communication networks.66 Trading floors, in the
opinion of some experts, remain in existence only for show, as a
relic of prior trading times to pose for news cameras.67 In the
last three or so years, trading reliant on computer algorithms
63. Mark Jewell, TJX Breach Could Top 94 Million Accounts, MSNBC,
Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21454847/ (last visited May 7,
2010).
64. Jaikumar Vijayan, Heartland Data Breach Could Be Bigger Than
Jan.
21,
2009,
TJX’s,
INFOWORLD,
http://www.infoworld.com/article/09/01/21/Heartland_data_breach_could_be_bi
gger_than_TJXs_1.html (last visited May 7, 2010).
65. For example, both Goldman Sachs and UBS have filed charges against
former employees stealing code from proprietary trading platforms. Katherine
Heires, UBS Charges 3 Ex-Employees with Code Theft, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS,
July 14, 2009, http://www.securitiesindustry.com/news/-23668-1.html (last
visited May 7, 2010).
66. See Jon Stokes, The Matrix, but with Money: the World of High-Speed
Trading, ARS TECHNICA, July 28, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2009/07/-it-sounds-like-something.ars (last visited May 7, 2010).
67. Id.
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has dramatically increased:68 high frequency trading accounts
for approximately 60% of trading volume, and this number is
expected to rise.69 Average daily volume has increase by 164%
since 2005, according to the NYSE, because of the activities of
“a handful” of traders.70 Some commentators believe serious
concerns exist over whether the practice of high frequency
trading itself might be a market manipulation,71 and case
studies show that the prices of shares purchased by other
“slow” traders are influenced in a detrimental manner to make
more profit for the high frequency trader.72 According to an
NYSE Euronext official, over 90% of orders submitted to the
New York Stock Exchange by firms using high-frequency
trading are canceled.73 Others insist that high frequency
trading is a desirable practice that enhances market exchanges.
The SEC has opened an investigation into the practice.74
Regardless of which position one accepts, what is
indisputable is that the information security of the transactions
and the management of the machines performing them create
potential for serious market disruption and provide an
attractive target for information criminality. In a business
environment where even the most sophisticated technology
companies fall victim to information criminals compromising
their source code,75 the securities industry is certainly not
68. Kristi Oloffson & Stephen Gandel, High-Frequency Trading Grows,
Aug.
5,
2009,
Shrouded
in
Secrecy,
TIME.COM,
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1914724,00.html#ixzz0hiZW
3PDT (last visited May 7, 2010).
69. High-Frequency Trading Surges Across the Globe, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Dec. 2, 2009,
http://www.smh.com.au/business/highfrequencytrading-surges-across-the-globe-20091202-k5yw.html (last visited May 7,
2010).
70. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in
Milliseconds, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at A17.
71. Id. (describing how slow trading firms were subject to different prices
because of high frequency trading activities by other firms).
72. See, e.g., id.
73. Jonathan Spicer & Herbert Lash, Who’s Afraid of High-Frequency
Dec.
2,
2009,
Trading?,
REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN173583920091202 (last visited May 7,
2010).
74. David Scheer, SEC Probes Manipulation by ‘Advanced Trading
Sept.
10,
2010,
Systems’(Update
1),
BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aGenyVbVDd2A
(last visited May 7, 2010).
75. For example, Google was recently targeted by a highly sophisticated
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immune from information security risks. Further, as a whole,
because of the current shallowness of the information security
talent pool, it is also likely to be less skilled in defending itself
than would be a sophisticated technology company.76
As the previous discussion of the Books and Record Crisis
articulated, the securities industry reflects a history of
problematized information handling. However, whereas the
previous information problems of the Crisis were driven by
internal inadequacies, now the information threats are driven
in part by external criminals. Hackers have successfully stolen
sensitive information from securities firms, including logins
and social security numbers, and have executed unauthorized
trades, in at least one case worth over $700,000.77 In fact, the
list of entities that have experienced information security
breaches during the last five years includes firms engaged in
high frequency trading.78 Although some firms’ business relies
in significant part of computerized trading, firms engaged in
high frequency trading do not always have a Chief Security

group of hackers who sought to gain access to its source code and that of
approximately thirty other companies. See, e.g., Zetter, supra note 62.
76. When attempting to find qualified candidates to staff information
security management positions, the current candidate pool is not large due to
the demands of the field. For a discussion of the qualifications of information
security management professionals, see, for example, Jessica Twentyman,
How Can IT Experts Make a Successful Move to a Career in Information
Security?, SC MAGAZINE, Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.scmagazineuk.com/howcan-it-experts-make-a-successful-move-to-a-career-in-informationsecurity/article/164504/ (last visited May 7, 2010). There is also a general
perception among technology professionals that working in research and
development in a technology company is “cooler” than working for a financial
services company, where their influence on corporate policy and products may
be limited or information security may be a low priority.
77. The SEC recently instituted an enforcement action against LPL
Financial after hackers obtained clients’ unencrypted names, addresses and
social security numbers, compromising the logon passwords of 14 financial
advisers and four assistants. The SEC fined LPL $275,000 and required that
LPL strengthen its security safeguards with respect to customer information;
the hacker(s) placed, or attempted to place, more than $700,000 in trades in
securities of nineteen different companies. LPL Financial Corp., Exchange Act
Release No. 58515, Investment Advisor Act Release No. 2775, 94 SEC Docket
170 (Sept. 11, 2008), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/3458515.pdf.
78. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, FBI: Russian Programmer Stole Stock-Trading
July
6,
2009,
Secret
Code,
WIRED,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/07/aleynikov/ (last visited May 7,
2010).
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Officer or Chief Information Officer with technical expertise to
meaningfully assess quality of their code and their information
risk.79 Meanwhile, source code for at least three proprietary
high frequency trading platforms has already been stolen by
rogue insiders,80 and other points of vulnerability almost
certainly exist in these systems. Computer code is never
perfect.
All computer systems are vulnerable to security problems
and attacks, including trading systems.81 A skilled attacker on
a vulnerable system can sometimes cause the owners of those
systems to lose control of their machines.82 In light of the high
volume of trades that rely on the integrity of high frequency
trading platforms, an injection of rogue code into a single
proprietary high frequency trading platform could have a
meaningfully negative impact on the market. Unraveling the
millions83 of trades of a high frequency platform gone haywire
across the world’s markets84 could cause disruption to not only
the firm using the corrupted platform itself but the markets as

79. For example, despite Goldman Sachs’s recent information security
breach, based on the Goldman Sachs website as of this writing, no executiveofficer-level position focused on information security risk appears to exist in
their governance structure, and no background information in the current
executive officers management team points to computer science expertise
sufficient in this author’s opinion to generate an impression of adequate skill
to meaningfully oversee high frequency trading operations. See, e.g., Goldman
Sachs, Our People: Executive Officers, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ourfirm/our-people/leadership/executive-officers.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
In a market where 97% of trading is computer mediated, it can be argued that
this is a significant management deficit.
80. See, e.g., Katherine Heires, Code Green: Goldman Sachs & UBS Cases
Heighten Need to Keep Valuable Digital Assets from Walking Out the Door.
Millions in Trading Profits May Depend on It., SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, July 20,
2009,
http://www.securitiesindustry.com/reports/19_75/-236961.html?zkPrintable=true (last visited May 7, 2010); David Kravets, Second
Banker Accused of Stealing High-Frequency Trading Code, WIRED, Apr. 20,
2010,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/04/bankerarrested/#ixzz0nEvwPB6u
(last visited May 7, 2010).
81. See Stokes, supra note 66.
82. See, e.g., Ryan Naraine, Patch Tuesday Heads-Up: 8 Bulletins, 5
(Apr.
9,
2009,
11:06
AM),
Critical,
ZDNET
http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=3116.
83. High frequency traders frequently trade thousands of shares each
millisecond. See, e.g., Duhigg, supra note 70.
84. High frequency trading is increasingly international. See, e.g., HighFrequency Trading Surges Across the Globe, supra note 69.
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a whole. Share price changes do not happen in a vacuum; other
firms will have traded on the market information that resulted
from the tainted high frequency trades.
Particularly if we consider these information security
failures in historical context—in the context of an industry
known to have a history of deficient recordkeeping and
management practices that have already once caused the
multi-billion dollar Books and Records Crisis in our
markets85—market integrity concerns arise. There is reason to
question whether stringent information security practices are
in place with respect to these companies’ proprietary trading
platforms. Additionally, some of the companies engaging in
high frequency trading and making markets are private
companies not subject to extensive SEC oversight.86 High
frequency trading with inadequate information security
presents a meaningful risk of market instability, potentially
with FAILS surpassing even the billions of dollars of “fails” of
the Books and Records Crisis period.87
Thus, the securities industry demonstrates the
unsustainable tension of many corporate cyborgs: while seeking
to generate feelings of trust in consumers and striving to put
forth a human face on their enterprises through spokespeople
such as the popular character of the eTrade baby,88 the last five
years demonstrate a dramatic shift in the industry toward
eliminating humans from the equation in favor of reliance on
autonomous and automated computer systems. The rise of high
frequency trading as a dominant trading strategy is the
product of the cyborg transformation in the industry, and its
dangers loom large beneath the technologies’ surfaces and the
companies’ anthropomorphic exteriors.

85. See Wells, supra note 36, at 203.
86. Just as the Crisis caused a recalibrating of power in the securities
industry in favor of a technocracy where only the strong survived, another
such wave of technocratic purging may be in its nascence. See, e.g., Liz Moyer
& Emily Lambert, The New Masters of Wall Street, FORBES, Sept. 21, 2009, at
40, 41 http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0921/revolutionaries-stocks-getconew-masters-of-wall-street.html (last visited May 7, 2010).
87. Wells, supra note 36, at 203.
88. The eTrade baby’s advertising confederates are the subject of a recent
commercial misappropriation lawsuit by actress Lindsay Lohan. See, e.g.,
Kieran Crowley, Lindsay Lohan Wants $100M over E-Trade Ad, N.Y. POST,
Mar. 9, 2010, at 5.
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IV. INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY
In the previous sections, this article has introduced a
fundamental tension between the human face and the
computerized innards of today’s corporation. It has argued that
both historical examples and current practices evidence
significant potential for harms to arise from mismanagement of
this tension. In other words, a deficit in information
accountability exists.
The law has been slow to drive meaningful improvements
to this information accountability deficit. Although the data
breach notification regime which currently exists in over fortyfive states significantly raised awareness of the risks of
information vulnerability, the level of information care inside
enterprises has not necessarily dramatically improved. In fact,
as the capabilities of the systems they use increase, the
information risks that pertain to them become more
substantive. As such, the tension between external and
internal corporate identity will continue to escalate.
A larger reconsideration of the bodies of law governing the
intersection of companies and information technology is
warranted. Such a reconsideration includes updating multiple
traditional bodies of law to reflect the changed technology
reality of today’s companies—corporate law, securities law,
contract law, intellectual property law, tort law, and criminal
law.
A. CORPORATE LAW
Two important shifts are needed in corporate law to
address the regulatory challenges presented by today’s cyborg
corporations. First, the law needs to acknowledge that the
value of corporate information assets is generated at least in
part through their economic and social embeddedness. Thus,
corporate law needs to acknowledge the interweaving of
information privacy from the consumer side and information
security from the corporate side. Data collection is a choice that
brings with it technology risks; it is not a necessity. Because
consumers cannot foresee future corporate uses of their
information or accurately assess the skill of companies’
information management, they rely on the expertise of the data
holders to protect them from harm. For example, databases of
information about consumers and their preferences are
corporate assets but, by definition, remain connected to the
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human subjects of that data. If mishandled, these databases
can harm the consumers whose data resides in them. Those
companies that choose to aggregate and share this information
should be deemed to owe a legal duty of stewardship to the
subjects of the data collection.89 It is common that in situations
where consumers place their trust in a specialized service
provider that the law creates a type of regulated industry or
registration regime. For example, in Delaware, over forty
various professions are regulated under Title 24 of the
Delaware Code because each presents unique risks to
consumers.90 So too the law should approach companies that
engage in information processing.
Second, as I have argued elsewhere,91 the rise of internal
corporate mechanization and the corresponding heavy reliance
on intangible assets requires the law to rethink fiduciary
duties. Fiduciary duties need to shift toward a paradigm of
ongoing management rather than their current focus on limited
oversight of extraordinary transactions.92
B. SECURITIES LAW
Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act took steps to recognize
the importance of information integrity in an organization with
respect to financial statements, its more aggressive posture
89. A parallel might be drawn to a researcher being obligated to protect
the identities and data of human subjects in her research.
90. The Division of Professional Regulation in Delaware regulates the
following professions: accountancy, realtors, landscape architects, architects,
real estate appraisers, podiatrists, mental health counselors, chemical
dependency professionals, chiropractors, funeral service providers, pilots,
veterinarians, dentists, psychologists, electricians, geologists, adult
entertainment, speech/language pathologists, audiologists, hearing aid
dispensers, doctors, dieticians, nutritionists, respiratory care professionals,
social
workers,
acupuncturists,
manufactured
home
installers,
plumbing/heating/ventilation/air
conditioning/refrigeration
professionals,
cosmetologists, barbers, nursing home providers, occupational therapists,
massage and bodywork professionals, optometrists, boxers and sparring
exhibition providers, pharmacists, possessors of controlled substances,
physical therapists, land surveyors, private investigators, private security
agencies, bail enforcement agents, pawnbrokers, secondhand dealers and
scrap metal processors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 24, §§ 101–5505 (2005 & Supp.
2008).
91. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Imagining the Intangible, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 965, 967 (2009).
92. Id. Specifically, the duty of good faith and the duty of care should be
modified to include concerns over ongoing management of intangible assets.
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towards audit of information assets has not, in practice, gone
far enough with respect to information care. As the discussion
of the securities industry in earlier sections highlights,
information handling practices leave room for improvement
even at the most sophisticated companies. Specifically,
securities law can be strengthened in at least two ways: first,
mandating CIOs or CISOs for all public companies and
financial services providers within the SEC’s regulatory reach,
and second, clarifying materiality standards for disclosure of
information security breaches and risks.
First, the SEC should mandate that every public company
and financial services provider within its regulatory reach must
designate a chief information officer or chief information
security officer, granting such position meaningful decisionmaking authority to oversee information handling inside the
company as a whole. Just as the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act required that all covered entities create
an officer-level position to consider the privacy implications of
the health data that the entity controls,93 so too securities law
should approach concerns over information handling among all
public companies and financial services providers. In a world
where 97% of trading on leading exchanges is done computer to
computer,94 and particularly in circumstances where an
organization is experimenting with technology-driven practices
such as high frequency trading, an officer level pool of experts
with adequate technological training to meaningfully oversee
and internally audit (and attest to the quality of) these
practices should be mandatory. Further, the SEC should devote
serious study to the systemic information inequalities95 and
new risks that technology mediated practices such as high
frequency trading introduce into the system. The potential for
malicious actors to partially destabilize our markets through
compromised computer code in trading platforms is a real
threat and such a large scale attack is, perhaps, merely a
matter of time.
Second, the SEC should clarify requirements with respect
to the materiality of disclosing information security breaches
93. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42
U.S.C. § 1320d et seq.,
94. Stokes, supra note 66.
95. Granting rights to some but not other players to co-locate servers may
present technology equity concerns.
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inside public companies. As I have argued elsewhere,96
disclosure practices of companies with respect to information
security breaches and risks vary even within the same
industry. Further, the diminished value of their assets
following a data breach may not always be reflected in lowered
share price in the market. The SEC must take a more
aggressive lead in creating a culture of information
accountability in our markets.
C. THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,
CONTRACT LAW, TORT LAW AND CRIMINAL LAW
The internal mechanization of companies increases their
reliance on technology and intangible assets. This reliance also
means that companies’ interest in aggressively protecting their
intellectual property increases in tandem. As a consequence,
they now sometimes rely on more proactive contract, tort and
criminal law postures when they perceive their intellectual
property to be at stake, emboldened by the uncertainties of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act97 and the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act,98 in particular. This strategic shift requires
clarifying the balance among intellectual property, contract,
tort and criminal law.
While working to maintain a trusted human face,
companies progressively shift new risk onto their customers
and employees through contract and related legal approaches.
Contracting practices demonstrate new knowledge imbalances
between drafters and consumers and have become
progressively more imbalanced in favor of the drafter over
time.99 Rights of recourse upon breach are being interpreted in
different manners by different courts. In practice, consumers
lack any meaningful ability to negotiate contracts for most
digital products and services; the law should rebalance the

96. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy,
Corporate Information Security, and Securities Regulation,. 3 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 129, 173–83 (2005).
97. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5, 17, 28 and 35 U.S.C.).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
99. See, eg., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Chapter 4: Mutually Assured
Protection: Development of Relational Internet Data Security and Privacy
Norms, in ANUPAM CHANDER ET. AL., SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET
AGE (2008).
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power balance in the relationship away from the corporate
drafter.
Although the companies employing or providing various
technologies should know about any risks associated with their
use, they sometimes fail to adequately test these products100 or
perceive themselves to lack a duty to disclose risks of use in
detail meaningful to users.101 For example, since the adoption
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, companies frequently
rely on digital rights management (DRM) technologies to
protect their intellectual property. These DRM technologies
sometimes make alterations to users’ systems in ways that
aren’t apparent to users; these changes are sometimes neither
technologically transparent nor clear from the way the
contracts governing use of the product describe the DRM. As I
have argued elsewhere,102 this shift toward greater information
parity can occur in part through creation of a more robust
construction of consent, one predicated on a reasonable digital
consumer standard. Similarly, though not all courts currently
enforce privacy policies as contracts, privacy policies should
indeed be enforced as contracts, and their breach should
provide basis for a breach of contract action and damages. This
approach, when coupled with data breach notices, would offer
one method for recourse in instances of information
mismanagement. Blanket protection from contract damages
and tort liability for digital products and services creates
incentives for lack of care on the part of companies.
Further, many companies do not consider themselves
obligated to address or mitigate the digital harms that arise
100. Recently, Google’s Buzz product caused uproar among consumers and
privacy groups when, after only internal testing, the product was launched. In
its initial incarnation, Google Buzz incorporated users’ Gmail contacts by
default in an opt-out model. An FTC complaint and at least one civil suit have
been filed in the United States, and Canada’s privacy commissioner has asked
for an explanation of the company’s conduct. See, e.g., Thomas Claburn, Google
INFORMATIONWEEK,
Mar.
8,
2010,
Buzz
Stung
by
Lawsuit,
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/privacy/showArticle.jhtml?arti
cleID=223200135 (last visited May 7, 2010).
101. One such incident involved digital rights management code used by
Sony in connection with music discs. See, e.g., J. Alex Halderman & Edward
W. Felten, Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode, 15 PROC. USENIX
SECURITY
SYMP.
1,
1
(2006),
available
at
http://cse.umich.edu/~jhalderm/pub/papers/rootkit-sec06.pdf.
102. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
529, 566 (2007).
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from use of their products or services. As I have also argued
elsewhere,103 a reasonable expectation of code safety should be
created with respect to licensors of digital products, as should a
duty to protect, correct and update problematic or vulnerable
code. The “harm” that arises in such a situation is in part the
failure to warn.
However, when considering the digital harm itself rather
than a failure to warn, complicating questions can arise when
considering a civil remedy for information mismanagement,
particularly with respect to quantifying damages and the
relationship with criminal law. In some cases, plaintiffs allege
that a breach of contract can lead to both a tort based remedy
and, potentially, a criminal prosecution. A circuit split
currently exists on questions regarding the intersection of
employment contacts, information breaches and civil and
criminal computer intrusion.104 Just as in tort and criminal law
generally, what constitutes an intrusion or an unwanted
technological “touching” of a user’s machine is contingent
entirely on user consent. The language used by computer
intrusion statutes revolves around “interception,” i.e.
monitoring without consent, and “exceeding authorized access,”
meaning surpassing the extent of consent.105 Two federal
statutes, as well as a patchwork of state statutes, use this
framework of consent in the context of criminal and civil
computer intrusion – the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act106 (ECPA) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.107 The

103. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hidden Engines of Destruction: The
Reasonable Expectation of Code Safety and the Duty to Warn in Digital
Products, 62 FLA L. REV. 109, 136–45 (2010).
104. See LVRC Holdings LLC. v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding employee use of employer information does not constitute
violation of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act). But see Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC
v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding employee use of employer
information constitutes violation of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act).
105. See infra notes 106 & 107.
106. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
ECPA is composed of Title I, amendments to the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. A. §§
2510–2522 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009), and Title II, the Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2711 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009).
Generally, the Wiretap Act prohibits interception of communications,
including those in transient storage. “Except as otherwise specifically provided
in” the Act, “electronic communication[s],” which are defined expansively, may
not be “intercepted.” § 2511(1)(a). An exception is provided for electronic
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balance among these four legal regimes – intellectual property,
contract, tort and criminal law – and the meaning of “consent”
must be crafted carefully to avoid turning mere breaches of
contract into a basis for criminal prosecutions.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that a progressive transformation
has occurred in companies: today’s companies reflect a hybrid
machine and human existence – a type of corporate cyborg
identity. Anthropomorphized entities reliant on their computer
communication service providers, but it only applies to “activity which is a
necessary incident to the rendition of [the] service or to the protection of the
rights or property of the provider of that service.” § 2511(2)(a)(i). The Stored
Communications Act restricts accessing communications that reside in a
particular system. The U.S. Patriot Act clarified at least one existing possible
ambiguity in the language of the Stored Communications Act, explicitly
including voicemail messages under its coverage. Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 283
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006)). The Stored Communications
Act’s main criminal provision reads as follows: “(a) Offense. -- Except as
provided in subsection (c) of this section whoever-- (1) intentionally accesses
without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that
facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall
be punished. . . .” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009). The Stored
Communications Act contains an explicit “provider” exception: “Subsection (a)
of this section does not apply with respect to conduct authorized -- (1) by the
person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service.” §
2701(c). It has been argued that this § 2701(c)(1) establishes almost complete
immunity for a service provider that “obtains, alters, or prevents authorized
access to” e-mail that is “in electronic storage” in its system. See Fraser v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e read §
2701(c) literally to except from Title II’s protection all searches by
communications service providers.”). A second provision of the Stored
Communications Act prohibits “a person or entity providing an electronic
communication service to the public [from] knowingly divulg[ing] to any
person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by
that service.” § 2702(a)(1). This provision also has service provider exceptions,
permitting a provider to give access to an electronic communication “to a
person employed or authorized or whose facilities are used to forward such
communication to its destination,” § 2702(b)(4), or “as may be necessarily
incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or
property of the provider of that service,” § 2702(b)(5). Some confusion exists
regarding the interaction of the two statutes and certain potential definitional
ambiguities. Most recently the interaction of the two parts of the ECPA was
discussed in United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
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systems, today’s companies rely heavily on intangible assets.
Because of this reliance, they use and experiment with
technological advancement. Sometimes this experimentation is
done imprudently. Thus, today’s cyborg companies introduce
new types of technology risks and exacerbate pre-existing
tensions in law. Using historical and modern examples from
the securities industry, this piece has argued in favor of
crafting a regime of information accountability: changes to
corporate, securities, intellectual property, contract, tort and
criminal law are needed to address these new risks that
accompany today’s corporate cyborgs.

